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Professor Thomas E. Dickinson
Division of Environmental Studies,
University of California, Davis:
In the Department of Agricultural and Applied Econornlcs
at the University of Minnesota, Dr. Raup ha~ b~en involved
in one way or another in teaching and research on land
economics, land tenure, and world agricultural dcvcloprnent
for at least 20 years that I have been reading his writinss.
In part, the reason for putting hlm as the last sp(>akcron
today’s program was because I have heard of his ability to
pull ideas together in this area. Therefore, I feel that
we are very fortunate to be able to have him here this after-
noon. 1 assigned him a topic which was entitled, “Agrarian
Reform, and the Effects on Land-Use Planning”. HC has had
extensive experience both domestically and abroad, and this
topic was suggested by L. T. Wallace who felt that this
would be an apt title with which to wrap up this particular
session.
Dr. Raup has spent a lot of time working on tax matters
in particular and hopefully he can pull together some of the
Issues we have been discussing in the last three sessions on
land use, taxes, and land reform. Dr. Raup.
9<
Transcript of a talk given at a conference on “Agriculture in the
Future and Its Implications for Land-Use Plannlng”, sponsored by
Continuing Education in City, Regional and Environmental Planning,
and University Extension, University of California, Extension Center,
San Francisco, May I-2, 1975.
~/
Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
University of Minnesota, St. Paul.2
We have heard quite a bit about tradition in this pr(l-bicentennial
year, and I think it is appropriate to reflect a blt on the traditions
that we have honored in practice rather than in preachment, in our 200
years of history as a nation. If I look back on the Jeffersonian ideal,
I find that it has been the subject of much rhetoric but not much honor.
The facts force us to conclude that there really is a dominant American
agrarian tradition , with two dimensions. It is not that we believe in
small farms, Rather, it is that the uniform policy prescription for
200 years has been to grow bigger, and to specialize. In terms of what
we practice rather than what we preach, that has been the outcome.
This 1s understandable. The people who migrated to North America had
had bitter, deeply etched experiences with diseconornies of scale in the
countries from which they came. They knew all about the problems of farms
that were too small. In the continental land mass that wc occupied as a
nation, this encouraged an expansionary policy based on a concept of
economies of scale in a political dimension that also made sense in an
economic dimension, and these reinforced each other. We developed an
agricultural economy that was guided by a belief that bigger is better,
and we also developed a polltlcal economy that was dominated by the same
principle.
With this background, it 1s worth reflecting on the fact that we may
have passed a watershed or have come to a turning point in that 200-year-
old history. For the first time today, we can find empirical evidence of
diseconomies of size m agricultural practice. That was not possible, or
was at least very difficult, in any previous generation. In the past, it3
was difficult to find more than a few examples of farms that were too big,
or large scale firms in agriculture that were in some sense performing a
disservice rather than a service, but today we do not have to look far to
find them. The biggest dimension of this diseconomy 1s the ability of
farms or firms today to pass their external diseconomics onto the community,
or their customers, or the state, or the nation. In other words, polute
if you can get away with it, and let somebody else pick up the tab. Engage
in activities that have disastrous price consequences for some other region,
but let the other region worry about it. Support heavy investment In
irrigation and water facilities that will help some lands but will impoverlsl)
other lands that are a little further down the economic chain, and let them
worry about it. In this sense and largely in the last 30 year~, we have
generated a family of problems of discconomies of size in agriculture that
are new in our experience.
There is another dlmenslon that is associated wit]) specialization.
We have livestock farms now that produce none or very little of their own
feed supply, and we have a large proportion of grain-crop farms that have
little or no livestock. This has had differential impacts on labor demands
in farming. We have exacerbated the labor peaks In crop farming while
smoothing out the labor supply required in some kinds of livestock farming.
For example, a big feedlot operated as a continuous flow operation has a
more or less uniform demand over the year for labor to run the feedlot.
At the same time the demand for labor on the crop farms that provide the
feed supply but that have no livestock enterprises has peaked to a sharper
peak. This has several consequences.
For one thing, it becomes rewarding to organize the withdrawal of labor
on large crop farms dependent upon hired labor because the damage done by4
denying labor at a critical season in the crop cycle has risen. We can
expect to see more of this type of effort to withdraw labor, to organize
a strike, because the rewards have increased.
In the livestock enterprise, on the other hand, while labor demand
has been stabilized the process has come to resemble that of a big chemical
plant, or a hotel chain. One of the most prominent dimensions is that the
emphasis shifts from a simple measure of size, like number of head in the
lot , or number of barrels of capacity, to throughput. Throughput becomes
the key criterion.
As a result, we have cattle feedlots today that suffer from the same
problems that plague hotel chains. Unless you can keep the occupancy rate
up around 75% or 80%, you are in trouble. When It comes down around 50
or 6077,you are bankrupt if you stay there very long. YOU must keep the
beds occupied in a hotel or motel chain or you go broke. You must keep
the pens full of cattle in a cattle feedlot or overhead costs will destroy
you . We have not previously had a structure of livestock feeding enterprises
that required continuous full-scale operation. Now we do, and we have a
good many bankrupt feedlots around, and lots that are underfilled and in
financial difficulty. As a result, we have increased the sensitivity of
the agricultural plant to weather and to economic forces. It is less able
to absorb shock in both a climatic sense and an economic sense.
The traditional multiple product farm provided a form of insurance.
If one enterprise was hit hard by weather in a given year, It was not usually
true that all enterprises were hit equally hard. What was lost on the crop
side could often be made up on the animal conversion side. With no livestock
on the crop farm, this opportunityis foreclosecLWe had that experience last
year. An early frost in parts of the corn belt caught many farms with no5
livestock to which the soft corn could be fed. We lost resiliency in
the agricultural economy as a result.
It will be helpful to examine several consequences of these chan[:es
that I have epitomized as functions of a preoccupation with economies of
size, and specialization. Some of these changes have been generated inside
agriculture, and are indigenous to the agricultural plant. Other forces
have come from outside, and are primarily a result of urbaniz.ltion and
industrial ization.
Time does not permit a discussion of technological advances within
agriculture that have made It possible to expand the scale of operations.
This is well known and well documented. Although I will not touch on It,
it is very significant.
I will turn instead to contributing forces that led to this expansion
in scale of operations that are not related to straightforward production




This introduces a web of relationships that we must weave together
a number of different strands. One strand is the sharply increased
population of taxpayers m the United States in higher income tax paying
brackets. In 1950, there were 84,000 taxpayers with taxable incomes over
$50,000 per year, and 125,000 in 1960. By 1972, this number increased
four-fold, to 597,000.
This big increase in
opportunities for lawyers
shelters. The first fact
greatly,
high-income taxpayers created rich new occupational
and tax accountants in the construction of tax
is that the demand for tax shelters has expanded6
The second strand is that we have inherited a series of accounting
rules and tax policles that were not designed or adopted consciously to
promote tax avoidance but that taken together have made agriculture
one of the rewarding places to look for a tax shelter.
Tax shelters in agriculture are comprised of several parts. First
is the preferential tax treatment for capital gains. This is not peculiar
to agriculture, but since capital in the fo~m of land and livestock is so
large a fraction of the total capital stock in agriculture, farming offers
particularly rich rewards for those hunting for tax shelters that depend
on the low rate of taxation of capital ,galns.
Perhaps I should remind you that in general terms, the first $50,000
of taxable capital gains is taxed at not more than 25%. Any capital gain
over $50,000 is taxed at not more than 35%, whereas the marginal rate on
earned income for a married taxpayer filing a joint return will rise to
60% at a taxable income of $88,000 and goes up to 70% at $200,000.
Whenever taxable incomes rises above $44,000 for this married taxpayer,
the marginal tax rate, that is, the tax paid on the next $10,000 earned,
will be 50% or higher. If additional Income IS received as a capital
gain, the tax rate will not be more than 25% on the first $50,000 and
never more than 35%.
Once taxable income rises above about $50,000, it is highly rewarding
to receive any additional income in the form of asset appreciation values
or capital gains, and not in the form of wages, salaries, or dividends.
If you are very wealthy, the reward is very rich. You can cut your
marginal tax rate in half in the extreme case.
The third strand results from the fact that farmers have been held
to be incompetent to practice accrual accounting and are permitted to report7
on a cash basis. Almost all other business firms that operate with the
size of turnover that characterizes a modern farm will be required by
the Internal Revenue Service to practice accrual accounting. This means
that you value inventory in, at the beginning of the year; you accrue
expenses only when they are incurred; you carry forward any unused coverage
(e.g., insurance) to the next tax year; and any supplies bought but not
used in the course of business this year are carried forward and included
in the year-end inventory when you inventory out. Inventory values enter
income performance during the tax year. You cannot buy a stock of supplies
that exceeds your requirements and deduct the whole cost of the purchase
as a business expense in that year. On a cash basis of accounting you
can do this.
On a cash basis, you deduct expenditures from receipts and the remainder
is your income. It is presumed that farmers can only keep books of this
kind. Anybody who buys into an agricultural enterprise and claims the
receipt of farm income is also permitted to report on a cash basis. A
wealthy non-farm investor will be treated as a farmer In reporting his
farming income. It then becomes rewarding for him to convert current
expenses into capital gains if at all possible.
The traditional tax dodge has been to buy breeding cattle, pay the
feed bill for as far in advance as possible, and deduct the cost as a
business expense, thus reducing taxable income in that year. When the
animals are sold, the proceeds above costs can be treated as a capital
gain, if the cattle have been kept more than two years. The difference
between the cost of production and the final sale price will be taxed at
not more than 25% for the first $50,000, and at 35% for any excess. In
the meantime, the total cost of the feed bill was deducted in the first8
year of the enterprise which in effect provided an interest free loan
from the Internal Revenue Service.
As a result, capital has been attracted into farming enterprises
in the United States by incentives that are not related to production
efficiency but that reflect ability to command the superior services of
the better tax accountants and lawyers. The biggest market for these
services is on the West Coast and in Texas. These regions have pioneered
in devising tax shelters that will shelter income for the very rich. The
centers are Los Angeles and Dallas.
As a consequence, we have capital invested in agriculture that is
out of line with the need for the products that the capital produces.
A classic case in California involved the projected expansion of
citrus and almond groves in the southern San Joaquin Valley, which
threatened to bankrupt other California investors in the same kinds of
production enterprises. The existing producers joined ranks and supported
a change in federal legislation that would force the inclusion of the
establishment costs of almond and citrus groves in depreciation accounts.
This was one of the reforms of the 1969 Tax Reform. Prior to 1969, it
had been possible to pre-pay the costs of establishing an almond or citrus
grove and deduct most of the cost as a current business expense, much
like the deduction of the feed costs for cattle.
The goal is to be able to treat the cost of creating a depreciable
or capital asset as an operating cost, and hence deductible for income
tax purposes. An example will make the situation clearer. If I huy
a farm and erect a new barn, I cannot deduct the cost of the new barn
as an operating expense. I must Instead set up a depreciation account,
estimate the life of the barn, and the depreciation each year is my
deductible expense.9
Alternatively, I can buy a farm with an old barn, undertake extensive
renovation, call it “repairs and maintenance”, and try to persuade the
Internal Revenue Service that the cost is deductible. It does not pay an
ordinary farmer to do this unless it increases his efficiency, since the
expense reduces his family income. The wealthy non-farm investor finds
it rewarding, since his level of living is maintained by his non-farm
income and the expense represents dollars that would have been taxed at
a high marginal rate if they had been added to his income. As a result,
the wealthy investor is tempted to over-invest in livestock, farm buildings,
equipment, irrigation systems, fences and other types of capital investment,
especially if the cost can be deducted as “operating expenses”. The typical
example is the wealthy oilman with a cattle ranch.
His opportunities are manifold. He can buy expensive breeding bulls,
and this has inflated the price of breeding bulls. He can put in a new
water system and refence the ranch, He can modernize the house, and build
roads, if it is a big ranch. Much of the cost can be treated as a current,
deductible expense. When he sells his breeding animals, or the entire ranch,
any increase in value over cost will be taxed as a capital gain. In the
meantime, if he has oil wells he has benefited from the depletion allow-
ance. If properly advised, he can in effect obtain much of hls operating
capital from the Internal Revenue Service.
This is where talent was invested in devising tax shelters, since it
was here that the rewards were greatest. To this situation we added
institutions in the 1950’s and 1960’s that were not new, but were modified
in very significant dimensions.
One was the Subchapter S Corporation. This was permitted by a changein
the Internal Revenue Code in 1958 to enable small businessmen to incorporate,10
but to enjoy the tax advantages of a partnership. If the small business
corporation has not more than 10 stockholders and not more than one class
of stock, and meets some other requirements, it can be considered a cor-
poration in terms of llability law but can be taxed as a partnership. The
significance of this change is that any profit or loss, and in particular,
any capital gain, can be passed through the corporation to the individual
stockholders whereas in a normal corporation this is not possible.
As a result, there has been a big increase in business firms in agri-
culture organized as Subchapter S Small Business Corporations, with less
than 10 stockholders. If there has been a capital gain, this can be passed
through the corporation and the individual stockholders can benefit from
the low tax rate. If there is a loss, the loss can also be passed through
the corporation and taken on the individual income tax returns. If the
stockholder is wealthy, the loss reduces income that would otherwise have
been taxed at a high marginal rate of 50% to 707.. He has lost, in effect,
some 50$, or 40c or 30c dollars.
Quite literally, the livestock journals have carried advertisements
from cattle feedlots in the Southern Great Plains m which the first line
of the ad reads: ItThegreate9t advantage in cattle feeding is to make money”.
The next line reads: I!Thenext best thing is to 10Sf2 mOneY”. The organizers
of the small business corporations or limited partnerships are perfectly
frank about their intent, and the clientele they are seeking.
In this sense, some strange institutions have emerged in agriculture
and have distorted capital investment patterns. One consequence is over-
investment in some private sectors to the point of surplus capacity, coupled
with distorted public capital investments that reflect the power of business
firms seeking the tax andaccounting advantages of investments in agricultural11
enterprises. This is especially the case with the tree and vine crops and
cattle herds.
The opportunities for this kind of tax avoidance are multiplied if
you can manipulate water as well as land. A much greater capital invest-
ment can be made in an irrigated farm than in a farm that is on dry land.
The possibilities of employing a tax lawyer to advantage are thus very
much greater when irrigation is involved. Moreover, the possibili.ties
of manipulating the political
almost always involves public
to the advantage of those who
In many California water
process are much improved since irrigation
investment and this can often be influenced
command political power.
districts, voting in water-district affairs
is based on land ownership, and in some districts it is proportionate to




may have, for example, 175 landowners and 40,000 people, but a
of the 175 landowners could determine the nature of water develop-
the entire district. A recent study of the Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District showed that four corporations farmed almost 85% of all
the land in the water district and one corporation (the J. G. Boswell Cor-
poration) was large enough to determine the outcome in any voting pro-
2/
cedure that concerned the water district.- Experience in California,
Arizona, Florida, the Mississippi Delta and elsewhere provides abundant
proof that a tax-sheltered incentive structure tremendously multiplies the
possibility of a distortion in capital investment and a degradation of the
political process, when irrigation or drainage are involved.
~/
Goodall, M. R., and James B. Jamieson, “Property Qualification Voting
in Rural California Water Districts”, Land Economics, Vol. L, No. 3,
August 1974.12
Tax shelters have not only distorted investment patterns but have
also created an unstable source of capital supply. Capital attracted
into agriculture by these considerations is unusually sensitive to the
business cycle. For a tax shelter to function there must be income to
shelter. A capital supply based on this incentive tends to increase
capital availability when it is least needed , and dry up the supply when
the economy is under stress. Substantial amounts of capital have moved
into and out of agriculture, for reasons that have had little to do with
the efficiency of its performance in productive enterprises. External
considerations drew it in the first place, and productivity considerations
are only indirectly related to decisions to withdraw it. This is apt,
for example, to exaggerate the price consequences of the traditional cattle
cycle. We have been demonstrating this in recent months.
We are currently liquidating cattle herds that were built up in part
by investors motivated by a desire to own cattle because of tax-shelter
considerations. Ranchers and investors kept on
a time when normal marketing strategies should





States in 1973 were produced
3/
in large-scale feedlots that are efficient only if they are kept full.-
In 1973-74 they gave an agricultural twist to the old joke about the mer’
chant who lost money on every sale but was making it up on volume. A
ranching and beef-feeding economy structured in this way provides reduced
opportunities to move up and down the intensity scale. You are, in effect,
operating a machine that has a go, no-go control mechanism. You either
run at full speed or you stop. At high levels of output it is very efficient,
but the feeding-pens must be kept full.
Jf
Meisner, Joseph C., and V. James Rhodes, “The ChangingStructure of U.S.
Cattle Feeding”, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of
Missouri, Columbia, Special Report 167, November 1974”13
As a result, we have had a supply of cattle coming onto the market
that did not reflect good judgments of about how many cattle were needed,
or a true profit and loss situation. The amplitude of cyclical movements
has been intensified and responsiveness to price signals has been dampened
and rendered less efficient.
There are two other important consequences of the trend toward
specialization. One IS the appearance of a landlord-tenant problem in
reverse. This too is new in our history. Our law, our ethic, and our
literature are full of references to a big landlord who is powerful and
a small tenant who is weak and defenseless. The big landlord-small tenant
syndrome has been a part of our cultural inheritance.
We are now finding that we have the problem In reverse, with big
tenants and small landlords. A number of firms in agriculture now rent
land from a great many small landlords who are more or less at the mercy
of their big tenants. The law is often not helpful, and experience
provides little guidance. The experiment station booklets and brochures
we can hand them were prepared for a flow of power in the other direction.
The production of vegetable crops, horticultural speciality crops, and
poultry is domnated by big firms that typically do not own the land and
buildings involved. In fact, they do not want to own these assets. They
want somebody else to own them, in small, fractionated pieces, which they
can then dominate, not as owners, but as tenants or contractors. This
capacity to dominate through the separation of ownership from control has
been very greatly extended by specialization in production and the develop-
ment of corporate forms of business organization in farming.
The other and potentially more serious consequence of specialization
relates to the concentration of market power on the demand side. Everything14
said thus far has concerned the supply side, too many cows being fed or
too many citrus groves being planted, etc. This is not where the most
serious abuse of power is to be expected. It is to be expected instead
on the demand side. When firms grow large the inevitable temptation is
to use economic power to control markets; to dominate not only supply
but also demand.
This can be done in two ways. A seller’s monopoly can dominate
by withholding products, or regulating the flow of products. “13ringing
order into the market” is the common euphemism. Or you can use an
advertising budget to create demand. If you are large enough, you can
do both.
The true measure of economic power in agriculture today is the ability
to command an advertising budget large enough to create a brand preference
that will in some sense tie the customer to a brand-named product. This
will then permit the firm to pass both the cost of the advertising campaign
on to the customer, plus a higher than average rate of profit. In this
sense, the full thrust of large-scale organizations in agriculture is not
necessarily measured by what happens when we look down the production
chain to the farmer, to the laborers, or to the efficiency with which
they produce, but rather is more dependent on what happens when we look
up the production chain to the ultimate consumer.
This is the point at which we shift from a consideration of changes
in farming and turn to exogenous changes, those external to farming, It
is at this point that we can begin to see that problems of structural
organization in agriculture and agrarian reform are dominated not by farming
considerations but by the city. We have a farm structure today that is
more a reflection of the structure and size of cities than it IS of production15
techniques in farming. The size, organization and function of farms is
increasingly dominated by the way we have organized cities, suburbanized
them, created shopping center% and have fostered large retailing enter-
prises that can dominate markets by sheer buying power and the volume
of their demand for standardized products. This is reflected back down
the production chain to the farms that can supply those products with
uniformity of size, quality and delivery dates and emerges at the farm
level as a determinant of the size and the structure of farms.
The tomato is the classic example. We build a tomato that can be
hauled in bulk in 5000-pound truck-loads and that will not crush when
dropped on a cement floor from three feet. They are picked at a stage
of ripeness that is called “green, mature”, a classification that reminds
me irreverently of
and engineers have
This was the goal.
the way we turn out graduate students. The scientists
produced a uniform product, with a long shelf-life.
But in the process, we have sacrificed taste differences
and taste thrills and I am not sure that in the long run we have expanded
the market.
This process of technological change has also dictated the size of
firm that can achieve the economies of large-scale production made possible
by machine-picked tomatoes. The nature of the reserach that went into this
development was tailored to a certain size of farm. There was no comparable
investment in tomato research that could be used by small-scale farms.
The research investment was highly skewed in its original commitment.
As a result, we have a technology in agriculture that is geared to
large size enterprises. This in turn is a reflection of big cities, big
retail outlets, long supply chains, and a focus on standardization and
shelf-life as the twin goals of food marketing. The ultimate goal is a16
uniform product that will fit into a standardized package and will not
jam up the machine. This is a consequence of our urban structure, to
which I would now like to turn.
We have subsidized this urban structure. It did not “just happen”.
It is not the result of inexorable forces of nature that we can do nothing
about. It is a direct consequence of large-scale Investments over a long
period of time. One of the most massive of these investments has been in
our highways. We have a structure of cities that has been powerfully
shaped by the way in which we collectand spend money for roads. we collect
money on the basis of a linear function of distance traveled. You pay a
tire tax and a gas tax and you get a highway. Money to build highways is
a linear function of distance traveled.
We spend it on the basis of an exponential function which is a com-
posite of distance traveled and the relief of congestion. So we have
distance and time in the expenditure function and distance only in the
collection function. The result has been a gigantic income transfer
mechanism. We spend to rellve congestion and we tax on the basis of the
number of times the wheels go around. In this setting, the way we finance
the highway system guarantees a transfer of funds to urban areas. We
subsidize the suburbs. In its importance for land use planning, this h
probably the largest single public transfer of money that has a direct
impact on land use and value.
The second way in which we subsidize our urban structure is in the
way we have financed housing. We began with the G.I. Bill after the Second
World War, establishing a principle that government would pick up much of
the risk element in housing loans. We expanded this with Fanny May and
other types of government insurance and mortgage guarantees, resulting in17
subsidized interest rates and lower down payments then would otherwise
have been possible. This was primarily available only to those who would
build single family detached houses. It was no~ available to build apart-
ments, or to build dense, compact settlements. In other words, our housing
subsidizes have promoted a demand for space.
Moreover, there is an economic incentive for creditors to prefer
sprawled cities. It is a reasonable presumption that the value of the
house will depreciate and the value of the land will appreicate. Within
limits, the larger the ratio of land value to house value in mortgage loans,
the happier the creditor. So the creditors preferred borrowers who would
build rather small houses on rather big lots in growing suburbs. The govern-
ment offered preferential treatment of the risk element, and there was no
comparable level of subsidy or incentive available to the person who did
not want to live in a single family house in the suburb. If you wanted
to share in this subsidy, you had to go to the suburbs to get it, and
many people got the message. We have subsidized suburban sprawl by the way
we financed housing.
These financial incentives for suburbanization have been augmented
by permitting the deduction of interest paid on borrowed money, as well as
the deduction of property taxes. If you wanted to maximize the deduct-
ibility privilege on your income tax return, the way to do it has been to
borrow money for the purchase of real property. For the middle-income
taxpayer the optimal way to share in this form of subsidy has been to
build a house in the suburbs and mortgage it to the hilt. The principal
effect of this form of subsidy has been to expand the demand for urban land.
We have also subsidized suburban sprawl by the way we permit munici-
palities to raise money through the issuance of tax exempt bonds. This is18
a gigantic revenue sharing device, in fact, the only effective federal-
Iocal government revenue sharing device we had until quite recently.
The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York has pointed out that this
resulted in a net revenue loss to the federal government of 3.3 billion
4/
dollars in 1971.- Who benefitted? Municipalities
voters to the polls and secure the approval of bond
approve bond issues? Growing suburbs with children
build, water systems and sewers to install and many
that can march their
issues. who will
to educate, roads to
other things to do
that will enhance the value of property. The incentives made available
by the federal government by functional revenue sharing through tax exempt
bonds flow heavily to the newer suburban communities. They WI1l approve
bond issues. It is very difficult to secure approval for bond issues in
old, established communities. The tax exempt municipal bond gives a
reduced income tax liability to the wealthy investor if he





the benefit is received by the suburbs. It is not
will make his
good . A major
surprising
have had a big increase in suburban communities. This has been
way to get a slice of the subsidy cake.
have also encouraged suburbanization by permitting the frag-
mentation of government on the principle of the western mining claim.
Our laws governing the formation of municipal government have encouraged
groups to stake out a clalm whenever they thought there was a rich lode
of property tax revenue to be mined. We permit them to put a fence around
it and say: This is ours, do not enter, we have a right to this tax claim.
The residents typically earn the money someplace else which they will use
g
Morgan Guaranty Survey, September 1973.19
to build their houses on our claim, but we are not going to worry about
that, We can capture their tax revenues if we draw the boundaries care-
fully, rig the zoning act properly, keep out the high cost residents,
attract the high income residents , and make money by mining the property
tax. The smart municipal subdivision does this.
The lowest rates of property taxation per hundred dollars of market
value in Minneapolis and Saint Paul are clustered in the richest suburban
subdivisions. They have the highest tax base because they include many
of the executives of corporations and business firms with salaries that
will support $150,000 to $250,000 houses. In effect, they have used the
structure of municipal government to withhold a portion of the tax base
from the rest of the community, and reward the formation of new suburbs.
The result is a further Inflation m the demancl for building land.
To this point we have been discussing what might be called the micro
aspects of land use. I turn now to the macro aspects, and to some frankly
controversial interpretations. We have subsidized the suburbs in the
United States, but that is not the only dimension m which our land use
pattern is the result of intentional or unintentional income transfers.
We have also subsidized entire regions. And now it might be wise for
me to clear a path to the door, because I may need to use it.
California ranks high among the states in which the structure of
settlement and intensity of land use have been highly subsidized.
The principal tools of this subsidization have been cheap fuel,
cheap water, and cheap food. Cheap fuel has encouraged an urban structure
and a life style that places excessive dependence on the automobile.
There has been a massive investment in highways in California, with much
of the cost borne by national trust funds. There has been a very large20
expenditure on water systems, some of which has been financed internally
but an important part of the cost has been passed outside the state,
through the pricing system or through the tax system. Underpriced water
in California has encouraged an expansion in industrial, residential and
agricultural uses that has distorted the water economy of the entire
Southwestern United States.
Cheap food has augmented these trends. lrtthe Southwest, the
availability of cheap grain prior to 1972 encouraged the growth of a
feed-livestock sector that will become very expensive to maintain If the
recent relative increases in grain and fuel costs prove to be permanent.
The rapid population growth in Arizona and Southern California has placed
some 15 million people at the end of a food and water supply chain that
will be increasingly sensitive to the rising cost of energy. It iS difficult
to construct any scenario for the future of this re~ion that does not
involve drastic changes in land use.
In this regard, California joins Germany and Japan as examples of
major economic areas whose rapid development since 1945 has benefitted
from North American grain surpluses. These areas are increasingly
dependent on imported food. The suspicion IS growing that this food
has been supplied at prices that prior to 1972 were below long-run oppor-
tunity costs. If true, this form of subsidy has fostered a distortion
in patterns of industrial location and settlement that may plague us for
years to come.
We can only speculate as to the consequences. One example of the
direction in which this speculation takes us is provided by the decision
of the federal government to underwrite the losses of the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation. The British partner In this economic disaster was Rolls-Royce,21
which is agruably the most prestigious engineering firm in the world.
It was permitted to go bankrupt. Lockheed, generally regarded as one
of the badly-managed business firms In America, was rescued. why? It
will be years, if ever, before we can answer this question but one ten-
tative answer may be suggested. A massive collapse by T,ockheedmight
well have triggered a crisis of confidence that could I]avcshaken the
foundation of the entire housing and real estate
California. No one knew what the domino-effects
wanted to find out. Lockheed was saved.
Diagonally across the United States we have
market in Southern
might be. No one
another example of a
major population concentration that is also at the end of a supply chain,
and increasingly sensitive to price rises In food and energy. Tl~eNew
England states were scared by the 011 crisis and the trucking strike
during 1973-74, to a degree that was unmatched in the rest of the country.
In California, cheap fuel and food contributed to what may ultimately
be Judged to have been the last of the traditional land booms in the
history of the settlement of the United States. In New England, cheap
fuel and food cushioned a decllne that had been under way for roughly
a century.
If we have come to the end of an era of cheap food and fuel, the
impact upon land use in the United States will be far from uniform.
Both the Northeast and the Southwest have been frightened, but the reaction
takes quite different forms. To the best of my knowledge, Los Angeles
is the only city that has set up a special program to train pollee in
the handllng of prospective food riots. Also to the best of my know-
ledge, the Agricultural Experiment Station Directors in the New England
States are the only ones who have been seriously exploring the ways in22
which they might increase the degree of self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction in their region.
Suffolk County, New York, on the eastern half of Long Island, is
famed as banker and stock-broker country, and is solidly Republican.
It is the first county in the United States to have authorized the pur-
chase of development rights, or the land itself, in order to preserve
its remaining agricultural open space. In almost any other jurisdiction
this would be condemned as outright socialization.
New Jersey is a bedroom suburb for upper-income famines fleeing New
York and Philadelphia. It 1s the first state in the country to be
seriously considering





the wholesale purchase of development rights on
preserve the remnant of its claim to be a Garden
have noted above that the size and structure of farms in the
States is increasingly a function of the size and structure of
This hypothesis can be extended. The reform in land ownership
rights and tenure patterns that is under way in the United States is
occurring first in urbanized areas and the leadership is coming from city
people. An agrarian reform is at hand , and its shock troops are the
asphalt peasants.
As I look at the way in which land development and subdivisions
have been carried out, where they have been carried out, and the areas
in which this process 1s dangerously extended, I ask myself” What will
be the impact of a sharp rise in the price of gasoline on those parts of
the United States that are now excessively dependent on the automobile?
Just how elastic is the demand for motor fuel? We do not know, and we




the demand structure. If there is, it will be reflected
for farm land at the suburban fringe. This is the cutting
If the pace of suburban expansion is cut back by the cn~rgy cost
of maintaining sprawled suburbs, the brunt of the cutback will fall on
speculators and developers who bought land that is not yet under houses,




gains. A considerable amount of the capital structure of rural
represents these expected capital gains.
the urban shadow it has been possible to mortgage farm land for
more than it 1s worth in farming and expect to recoup in the process of
urban expansion. The mortgage proceeds are often used to maintain family
levels of living and to cover any operating deficits and the farmers can
keep on farming.
income and richer
come to a stop in
They may be growing poorer every year in terms of annual
every year in terms of net worth. This process may well
suburban fringe areas.
There is another but related process that may also be sharply retarded
and that is the widespread practice of cost-plus government contracting.
If we want something produced that is not normally traded in the market-
place, the conventional solution has been to insure the producer against
loss with a cost-plus contract. We introduced government cost-plus
contracting on a widespread basis during the Second World War, and main-
tained it and even expanded it in some sectors and regions under the impetus
of the Cold War, the Korean War, the space race and the Vietnam War. Urban
expansion in many areas that have experienced the most rapid growth during
the last 30 years has been a history of business and Industrial activity
that depended heavily on cost-plus government contracts. This may not be
coming to an end, but It seems certain to slow down.24
This may be one of the most significant consequences of tileend
of the Vietnam War. I doubt that there will be as much cost-plus con-
tracting in the next decade as we had in the last. The implications
for future growth trends in regions that have been the principal bene-
ficiaries will be profound. These cost-plus contracts have generated
demands for housing and therefore for land in areas that may now experience
a prolonged period of stagnation. The impact will be greatest in those
areas in which the pattern of land holding reflects the greatest expectations
of land value appreciation. These expectations have been the primary driving
force in our housing industry. The location, scale, and speed of housing
development have become functions of the expected rate of capital gains.
Put yourself In a developer’s shoes. Can he affect the labor wages
that he pays? Only in marginal cases. Can he affect the interest rate
he pays? In some cases, yes, but in general he must compete for capital
in a national market. Can he affect the price of building materials?
Probably not very much, even If he is a large-scale developer. What can
he affect? The cost of land. His success depends on buying land cheap,
and selling It dear. Everything else that he buys is purchased in a
national market and at price levels that he cannot influence. But he can
leapfrog, buy and develop cheap lan~mount an adequate advertising cam-
paign and persuade prospective home-buyers to share with him in the antici-
pated capital gain. His marketing skills, organizing skills, and manage-
ment skills are focused on land value appreciation. He succeeds only if
he can suburbanize the countryside. He cannot function unless he can
sprawl. His profit depends on his ability to capture a part of the economic
rent that results from appreciation in the value of land.
This is the process that IS being subjected to increasing criticism.
It has distorted the land use pattern and capital structure in real estate,25
both urban and rural. It is the dominant, though not the only deter-
minant of our pattern of dispersed urban settlement. If it continues,
it will have a profound impact on the composition and cost of our food
supply.
To the mid-twentieth century, the search for capital gains in land
had exercised a relatively benign Influence in the economic development
of the United States. It promoted the rapid settlement of a continent,
gave some stability to the commitment of capital to slow pay-out invest-
ments in rural and urban land development, and created a tax hasc that
provided a measure of financial independence for local Kovernmnts. ThcIsc’
are monumental achievements. But we now need to question the direction
this development lS taking.
This reexamination is forced upon us by two trends which we can
sense but cannot quantify. They compel us to a~k two questions.
1) What is the extent and significance of the loss
of agricultural land to non-farm uses?
2) What is the extent and significance of concen-
tration in the ownership of wealth in real estate?
The opportunity to share In capital gains in land was widely dispersed
in preceding generations. Millions of relatively small farmers shared in
the land value increases that accompanied our economic development until
well after the Second World War. As their numbers declined, their place
in the population of those who could share in anticipated capital gains
was taken by suburban home owners, a replacement process that lasted until
the end of the 1960’s. It IS possible that the proportion of the population
of the United States that could reasonably expect to share in capital gains
in land reached a peak in the two decades, 1950-1970.26
The cost must be measured in urban sprawl. Any retardation in sprawl
raises questions about the threat of a growing concentration in the owner-
ship of landed property.
In agriculture the hope of capital gains has retained manpower and
capital in farming. There has been a trade-off between income and wealth.
But the population of those who can work for reduced incomes ~very year
and die rich is diminishing. Land ownership is essential to this solution
of the low income problem in agriculture. Much of our agricultural out-
put in the past has been produced by farmers who were underrewarded throu[:l)
the price system but who offset this with rewards received through the
capital structure, This has held down the price of food. The cost of our
diet has been lower than it would have been if farmers had been compelled
to seek all their reward through the income flow. If we preclude the
possibility of rewarding part of the management, labor, and land invest-
ment in farming through the capital structure and force all rewards through
the income flow, then farmers will demand higher incomes. They will no
longer work long hours for substandard labor incomes. This will create
a permanently higher cost base for food products.
If it develops that a reactively few landowners are receiving most
of the capital gains in land, this will become intolerable in a political
democracy. In the business world, the classic response to those who corner
a market is to reorganize the market and declare the stock worthless. If
too few people have too large a share of the national wealth in land, any
responsive democratic government will be compelled to prevent them from
reaping the capital gain. This is the course being followed in varying
degree in Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and several other countries.
This is the prospect that awaits us.27
If it comes to pass, it will cause a complete restructuring in
our housing industry, our structure of government> t~~esize of our
cities, the competition between urban and rural areas for land, the
price of food and many other things. The evidence is already per-
suasive that this constitutes the principal challenge of land reform
for our generation.28
Questions
Q. Am I to understand that to zone land exclusively for agriculture
prohibits subdividing It and will prohibit the sale of it and divi-
sion of it for urban growth or anything other than agriculture?
Isn’t this liable to create a virtual panlc~ Because people are
relying on land development and the sale of land to ball them out?
A. Proposals for exclusive agricultural zoning or the limitation of
urban growth do generate violent reactions. Unless you have partici-
pated in this experience ~ You have no Idea how bitter the reaction Carl
be. Anyone who proposes limitations on urban growth that will reduce
the prospects of capital gains in land will be called a Communist,
and charged with the destruction of the roots of American democracy.
In Minneapolis-St. Paul we are now debating a proposal to limit urban
expansion. Landowners in the suburban fringe, local government officials
from communities just beyond the existing suburbanized areas, and housing
developers have grown skillful in playing on these fears. But there
are also many people who are increasingly aware of the costs of unre-
strained urban growth. And there is also a growing awareness that
those who are paying the price of this growth are not the ones who are
receiving the benefits.
Q. Your final comment was what I’d hoped you would start with. Can I
ask you to be a little blt more specific about it. What do you per-
ceive as being the political possibility of that kind of redistribution?
Can we generalize from some experiences that have happened in other
countries? A lot of people have talked about land reform a la Latin
America, or land reform a la someplace else, and I guess I am really
asking, what does it mean to have land reform. What are the Implications
for the United States?
A. I had consciously raised this topic at the end of my talk, thinking
that there would be questions. Perhaps an example of one approach
will be helpful. The Minnesota legislature IS currently considering
a bill to authorize the state to buy agricultural land, hold it, and
sell or rent it to farmers, to relieve them from the pressure of29
acquiring or carrying so large a capital stock in land. TileCOSt
of getting started in farming has become prohibitive. Even if you
inherit one, you can not now transfer the larger farms in Minnesota
in the best farming counties of the state without a tax so large that
it will force a Llquidatlon of some of the assets. We are developing
an agricultural structure in which the only way to get started in
farming is through inheritance or marriage. As a result, the problem
of maintaining the capital structure in agriculture will probably
persuade many people who have been opposed to government interference
in this field to consider some drastic alternatives. This specific
alternative is similar to the “Land Bank” program that is being tried
in Saskatchewan.
Q. How do they propose to finance such a thing as this?
A. Initially, with a government injection of capital, but on the principle
that over a long period of time it will be largely self-financing. This
has been the experience in Sweden, and the intention in Saskatchewan,
although the Saskatchewan plan has not been In existence long enough to
provide a test.
There are several instruments that are available for us to study, but
not necessarily to adopt. One is the procedure under which the Swedish
County Boards have authority to buy agricultural land to accomplish
structural reform goals, hold it, restructure it, and resell it. In
other words, they can do in rural areas what we do through urban re-
newal authorities in urban areas in this country. In Sweden, this was
done primarily through an active land purchasing program. In extreme
cases, they can use eminent domain, that is the power of the state to take
private land by condemnation and resell it to another private person,30
which we do in urban renewal programs. But this power was used very
rarely in Sweden.
Once started, the program becomes more or less self-financing. A
similar policy was of long standing in the city of Stockholm, where
for decades the City Council has authorized the purchase of land in
advance of expected expansion, with a goal of keeping twenty years
ahead of the need for land. Thiq policy of municipal purchase of
land required for anticipated urban expansion IS the’primary explanation
for the development of the model suburbs for which Stockholm is famous.
The French have created similar authorities, called SAFERS, an acronym
that can be roughly translated as Societies for Land Tenure Reform and
Rural Restructuring. Once a SAFER has been created it has authority
to buy land from private owners, consolidate small parcels into viable
farm units, and resell the farms. Alternatively, they may sell some
of the land to existing farmers to permit farm enlargement.
Once this type of policy has been established, one possible extension
or alteration is to lease the land on long term leases instead of
reselling it. In fact, the Saskatchewan Land Bank legislation includes
the express intent that the farmer will be given the option of leasing
the land instead of buying it, in which case they retain control over
the disposition of the land. In effect, they accomplish the ultimate
in zoning. This is one way to resolve the capital problem for a begin-
ning farmer in that it does not compel every generation to refinance
the capital value of the total land investment.
What we are really talking about is some way to get over that hurdle.




land in fee simple, and be satisfied to achieve security in some
other way.
You said the legislature in Minnesota is considering a program of
buying and reselling. Considering, but not buying or leasing it
as yet. Is that right?
Yes, the proposal is at a very early stage and is being debated
before committees of the legislature.
May I ask you if you have time to look at the development right
concept that is being taken up in Vermont?
Yes, certainly. This is another option. The right to d~’velopland
can be purchased or, as is the case with the Ramapo plan in New York
state, the presumption is that they might even receive a donation of
the development rights. It is the possibility of donation that intrigues
me.
If you sweeten up the cake enough, you might get donations of develop-
ment rights, and bypass the whole cumbersome purchase mechanism. This
could be achieved by giviungland owners a major tax concession, if they
donate the development
thus far, for example,
involving preferential
rights. The tax concessions that have been given
under the Williamson Act in Callfornla, and
taxes for agricultural land, have been basicaLly
tax relief measures for landowners and not devices to control urban
growth or preserve open space.
In fact, the existing programs have generally been inequitable, because
a few landowners receive most of the benefits. This has been the case
with entries under the Williamson Act in California, and It IS also
true with the tax reductions provided under the so-called “Green Acres”
law in Minnesota. The biggest single agricultural land holding registered
llnder the Minnesota tax abatement law is owned by the president of one32
of the largest business firms in the state. The law was designed
to preserve agricultural land uses in urban fringe areas, but people
eventually will get a llttle tired of subsidizing that type of land-
ownership. The other alternative options include the purchase of
development rights, the use of eminent domain or condemnation to acquire
development rights, or sweetening up the tax abatement schemes so that




these approaches might work.
that going to solve the problem with the estate tax?
some extent it may, if it retards land value increases. The estate
and inheritance taxes provide a classic example of fiscal creep.
Inflation in land values has a particularly acute impact on these
forms of taxation. The Inheritance tax in Minnesota, for example,
yielded about 500,000 dollars worth of revenue in 1956 and 39 million
dollars worth of revenue last year. It has been the fastest growing
tax in the whole Minnesota tax structure, by far. The reason is inflation.
With no significant change in the rate structure since the 1930’s
inflation has been forcing land values up through the tax-rate sieve
so that much more of the estate is now taxable. The cure for estate
tax problems IS to slow down the rate of inflatlon in land values.
One of the things that you said frightens me and that is getting the
federal government Into the landlord business. I’m assuming that this
would involve some bureaucrat, somebody who is not even interested in
guarding the land. The bureaucratic reputation 1s legendary. All
you have to do is think about the IRS or somebody like that, administering
the custodial shifting of land. Isn’t there some other way that we might
be able to accomplish that, like letting all farmers incorporate, or
maybe even creating a brand new institution thak will avoid estate taxes
in transferring land?33
A. Yes, you could do that, but remember that land law is still state
law, and we are really talking about state governments, not the
federal government. The history in the other countries where It has
been tried is that It has been impossible to prevent the fortunate
few who had economic power in their political system from us~ng it
to get a disproportionate share of the advantages. So they wind
up with the biggest part of the cake. This is the risk that 1s involved.
Q. So you have your choice between increasing the bureaucratic power of
the government or beneflttmg a chosen few?
A. Yes, perhaps we do. But the significance of the bureaucratic criticism
is being vetoed or nullified now, because we have more and more private
firms holding land who exhibit the same rigidities that any large
bureaucracies exhlblt, whether private or public. We now have business
firms in agriculture that are capable of the senescence that has charac-
terized the railroads. We never had that before. We have never had
business firms in agriculture that were capable of hardening of the
economic arteries.
The greatest advantage of the small farm, a la Jefferson, was the
cheap social cost of failure. It could go broke at a low social cost,
and it could absorb underemployment with less dislocation. It could
disguise real unemployment by perm~tting it to be treated as under-
employment, and this did not involve a loss of prestige or sclf-
esteem on the part of the worker. It involved a very low social cost
on the part of the community.
When we move these workers outside their proprietary enterprises, and
force them to obtain all their rewards through the wage structure,
and then declare them unemployed, they have no option but loss of34
prestige and self-esteem. There is no way, so far, in this country
that we can disguise unemployment, e.g., in General Motors, by som~’
form of socially and privately acceptable underemployment. There are
some unions working on thlsj but functionally we don’t have it yet.
But we have had it.in agriculture. This capacity to absorb unemploy-
ment and disguise it as underemployment is a real social asset.
Economists generally condemn underemployment. I think most of my
colleagues would disagree with the argument just presented, don’t
you? But there is a great social plus in a structure of buslncss
firms that is not compelled to declare people unemployed every time
a certain curve goes below a certain line. A structure of small farms
is not as uneconomic and fragile as it might seem. Vor the same reason
that they can go broke easily, they are peculiarly able to draw up
their belts. They can survive disaster.
Q. A central problem is this estate tax. I don’t know myself how to judge
the advantages of small farms and large farms and probably the issue
of bureaucracy is important. In my observation, we fail to compare
systems. We compare a small unit with a large un~t, and really what
we should have been doing is comparing a collection of small un~ts
with one large unit. In other words, make comparisons between two
comparable systems, and then come up with estimates of the social
consequences and economic consequences. My observation is that a
collection of small units can still reflect this same bureaucracy.
I have a problem m deciding whether or not you are really addressing
the issue of the estate tax in trying to keep a certain group of
people farming the land or whether you are considering big farms vs.
small farms and what the economies of scale are.
A. There are two concerns with the estate tax. One is the concern that
arises from the combination of no change In the rate structure and a
high degree of inflatlon. This has reduced the significance of the
exemptions so greatly that the tax has a different impact than was
originally intended. The rate structure has been rendered obsolete
by inflation and farm size expansion. As a consequence, the conventional35
family farm that could be passed on without being destroyed through
inheritance and estate taxes in the 1950’s and 1960’s cannot now bc
passed on without risk of destruction.
There is another concern that is politically important. A number of
investors who put their money into land for tax shelter or other
reasons now find that the land has appreciated in value and tl~~’y arc
in a much higher estate and inheritance tax-paying bracket then they
realized. They have suddenly become aware of what estate and inllcritanc{’
taxes will do to them. The pressure for rc’form1s coming frun both
the topside and the bottomside of the farm land ownc’r~llip structure.
Q. what would happen if you do away with estate taxes? }IOW do YOU kc)cp
from freezing landownership patterns the way they arc today?
A. You can’t do away with estate taxes. Not in a democracy, because It
would lead to progressive distortions in the distribution of income
and wealth. It would also remove a major feature of the tax structure
that tends to equalize wealth dlstrlbutlon over time. It may not
do a very good job of equalization, but it is not worthless.
Don’t we have to distinguish between the federal estate tax and the
state inheritance taxes, one being made payable by the estate, and
one falling on the heirs? The effects are different. The other point
I’d like to make concerns the inference that I draw from your comments
that any publlc acquisition of land w1ll have to occur at the state
level. In other words, it will be the states that are Ilkely to be
the owners of land acquired by the public to achic:veland use ~oal.s.
There must be bills in at least ten state legislatures that are moving
in this direction, either through the purchase of development rights
or in other ways. 1’11 talk about that tomorrow, but It seems to me
that the inference 1s that remedial action will be taken at the state
level so that the new owners WI1l become tenants of the state with a
lifelong contract, subject to being passed on. Whether the federal
courts will consider that a sham, to get around the Income tax or the
inheritance tax, I don’t know, but T.can see It happening. At the
federal level, the nationalization of land, I think, would at this
time create a lot of hostility.
A. I do not think that It IS workable, and I would oppose It flatly. A
more likely solution in the American tradition would be to create36
special land bank or land management districts. And that ]s not
as foolish as it may sound. That is essentially what tileFrt’ncl~
did. Their SAFERS are similar in some respects to small wat(’rsllecl
or drainage dlstrlcts, and quite similar to our urban r~’n~’w.al
authorities. They are designed to brlclgeover cx]stlng un]ts of
government to achieve a special purpose. We have a Ion}: .lnd on
the whole successful tradition in the Unltcd States in tllcoperation
of special districts of this kind.